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Abstract
The Florida Supreme Court during the Survey period of January 1
through November 30, 1985, decided cases involving a wide variety of
contracts: insurance, antenuptial, employment, sale of goods, sale of
real property, mortgage, option and settlement.
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I. Introduction
The Florida Supreme Court during the Survey period of January 1
through November 30, 1985, decided cases involving a wide variety of
contracts: insurance, antenuptial, employment, sale of goods, sale of
real property, mortgage, option and settlement. The variety of clauses
considered was also broad: covenants not to compete, due-on-sale,
choice of law, and others.
Insofar as one emerges at all, two themes are discernible. First, the
court appears strongly inclined to enforce contracts as the parties have
written them. In 1985 it enforced contracts according to their literal
terms despite lower court cases of long-standing, despite statutes that
purported to amend such contracts, and in the face of public policy
arguments of considerable force.
Second, a lawyer trained in the common law tradition will be sur-
prised at the extent to which the cases reflect the growing impact of
statutes on private contracts. Nearly half of the thirteen cases discussed
in this article raised substantial statutory issues.
II. Contracts, Fraud and Duties to Disclose
Fraud, although a tort, is probably the most frequent ground upon
which cancellation of a contract is sought.' Rules concerning fraud
may be changed either by judicial decision or by legislation. The 1985
Florida cases include examples of both means. Two cases in this area
* A survey article of this type requires some streamlining of the primary
material. Emphasis here will be given to changes and clarifications of the law as
enunciated by the Florida Supreme Court during the Survey period; procedural
complexities and non-relevant issues of the cases will be largely disregarded.
** A.B., 1971, Cornell University; J.D., 1980, New York University; Assistant
Professor of Law, St. Thomas University.
1. See generally W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS § 105 at 726
(5th ed. 1984). Although formally a tort, the development of fraud and contract have
been closely related: "in the great majority of the [fraud] cases which have come
before the courts the misrepresentations have been made in the course of a bargaining
transaction between the parties."
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concern a contracting party's duty to disclose material facts to the
other party to the transaction. In a third, the court reduced the stan-
dard of proof necessary to establish fraud.
A. Creation of a Duty to Disclose Material Defects: Johnson v.
Davis
As recently as 1982, a Florida district court had upheld the tradi-
tional rule, generally called caveat emptor, that the seller of a home
could remain silent as to material defects in the home without fear of
liability.2 In Johnson v. Davis,3 the Florida Supreme Court unani-
mously imposed a new duty on the seller of a home: the duty to disclose
to a purchaser material defects in the home. Where the new duty is not
fulfilled, a purchaser injured by the seller's silence will have a cause of
action in "fraudulent concealment." 4
The case under review was brought by the Davises, the purchasers
of the defendants' home. The Johnsons' home was three years old when
in 1982, they entered into a contract with the Davises to sell it for over
$300,000. The contract was signed and the D.avises paid the $5,000 to
the Johnsons. Before the next, larger down payment was made, Mrs.
Davis noticed some ceiling stains and some buckling and peeling in the
house, all suggesting water damage. When questioned, Mr. Johnson ex-
plained that these resulted from several causes, none having to do with
the roof or water damage. The Johnsons assured the Davises that there
were no problems with the roof.5
The Davises then made an additional payment. Several days later
Mrs. Davis discovered water "gushing" from at least five areas of the
ceiling and windows, including the light fixtures. The roof in fact was
full of "problems." The Davises sought rescission of the contract on the
grounds of fraud and misrepresentation.
The court had little difficulty in finding that the Johnsons had
committed fraud by representing that there were "no problems" with
the roof. Since the second down payment had been made after this
misrepresentation, traditional rules of fraud applied and restitution was
granted.
2. See Banks v. Salina, 413 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Accord,
Ramel v. Chasebrook Constr. Co., 135 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
3. 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
4. Id. at 629.
5. Id. at 626.
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The more difficult question was whether the Davises should be
able to recover the $5,000 payment made before the misrepresentation.
The issue required the court to reconsider the traditional Florida rule
that the seller of a home has no affirmative duty to disclose "latent
material defects" to a buyer.
Like most common law jurisdictions, Florida had traditionally im-
posed liability for affirmative acts of deceit and harm (misfeasance) but
not for simply remaining silent (nonfeasance).6 In Johnson, however,
the court observed that both misfeasance and nonfeasance could result
in a false belief and were therefore equally "violative of the principles
of fair dealing and good faith. .... ".
Finding earlier Florida cases relying on caveat emptor "unappetiz-
ing," 8 the court noted that numerous other jurisdictions - including
California, Illinois, and New Jersey - had rejected the caveat emptor
tradition and imposed a duty on the seller of a home to disclose latent
material defects. The court decreed that Florida should join these
states, and accordingly laid down a new rule: "[W]here the seller of a
home knows of facts materially affecting the value of the property
which are not readily observable and are not known to the buyer, the
seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer."
The court added, "This duty is equally applicable to all forms of
real property, new and used." That is, both the developer-builder and
the individual owner have the same obligation toward a purchaser.
Having formulated its new rule of law, the court held that the
Davises were entitled to the return of the initial $5,000 deposit since
"the Johnsons were aware of roof problems prior to entering into the
contract of sale and receiving the $5,000 deposit payment."10
B. Antenuptial Agreements and the Duty to Disclose: Stregack
v. Moldofsky
The result could hardly have been more different in Stregack v.
Moldofsky.1' Here the supreme court held not only that prospective
6. Id. at 628.
7. Id.
8. Id. The court referred specifically to Banks, 413 So. 2d at 851, and Ramel,
135 So. 2d at 876.
9. 480 So. 2d at 629.
10. Id.
11. 474 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1985).
1986]
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spouses in Florida have no duty of disclosure when entering into ante-
nuptial agreements, but - more astoundingly - that even conceal-
ment or active misrepresentation will not invalidate such an agreement.
That is, no cause of action exists by which a surviving spouse can seek
to set aside an antenuptial agreement on the ground of fraud in the
inducement.
Before their marriage, the Moldofskys had both signed a written
agreement in which each waived all rights in the other's estate. Mr.
Moldofsky made no provisions for his wife in his will, inserting only a
reference to the antenuptial agreement. When her late husband's will
was admitted to probate, Mrs. Moldofsky filed both for an elective
share and cancellation of their antenuptial agreement. Mrs. Moldofsky
alleged her husband had committed fraud at the time the agreement
was signed by claiming that he had no assets when he in fact possessed
assets worth approximately $250,000.12
The supreme court precluded Mrs. Moldofsky from pursuing her
fraud action by strictly applying Florida Statute section 732.02, which
provides that no disclosure of assets need be made before entering into
an antenuptial agreement: "No disclosure shall be required for an
agreement, contract, or waiver executed before marriage.' 3 The stat-
ute was clear enough on its face, but the Third District Court of Ap-
peal had held that one loophole existed - that disclosure itself need
not be made but, where it was, it must be made truthfully. 4 Mrs.
Moldofsky alleged not that her husband had remained silent (failed to
disclose) but that he had affirmatively misled her (made a false
disclosure).
The-supreme court brushed aside this distinction, saying that such
an interpretation would reward the "silent spouse" but punish a spouse
who "attempts" some disclosure. 15 The court further stated that the
legislative intent was clear: in Florida there is to be no duty of disclos-
12. Id.
13. FLA. STAT. § 737.702(2) (1983). The reader should note that the statute
makes quite opposite provisions for postnuptial agreements: "Each spouse shall make a
fair disclosure to the other of his or her estate if the agreement, contract or waiver is
executed after marriage." Id. (emphasis added).
14. See Moldofsky v. Stregack, 449 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (reversed in the case under discussion): "A would-be spouse is under no duty to
make any disclosure .... The statute, however, cannot and should not protect one who
voluntarily averts the truth and thereby misleads a party into contracting the
marriage."
15. 474 So. 2d at 207.
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ure - truthful or otherwise - concerning antenuptial agreements.
Finally, the court did describe one ground upon which an antenup-
tial agreement could still be set aside in Florida. Where the surviving
spouse had been misled as to the nature of the document being signed
- for example, a marriage license application instead of an antenup-
tial agreement - cancellation of the antenuptial agreement may be
sought.16
In a case of lesser significance, Evered v. Edsell,17 the court again
faced a surviving spouse's challenge to an antenuptial agreement and
again dismissed the suit. In this case, Mrs. Edsell sought to have an
antenuptial agreement set aside on the ground of overreaching. The
crucial issue here was the applicability of the Second District's Lutgert
presumption. Under Lutgert v. Lutgert,18 once a spouse has submitted
certain evidence suggesting unfairness, 19 a presumption of undue influ-
ence or overreaching comes into existence. The presumption shifts the
burden to the other spouse to show voluntariness. The supreme court
held that Lutgert had no applicability in probate proceedings, appar-
ently accepting petitioners' argument that such a presumption is not
warranted in light of section 732.702.2o
Clearly, the court construes section 732.702 as a virtually impene-
trable shield protecting antenuptial agreements from subsequent at-
tack. In Edsell, as in Moldofsky, the court cited Estate of Roberts"
for the proposition that such an agreement may be set aside only on
such narrow grounds as coercion, incompetence, or a signature "other-
wise improperly obtained. 22
16. Id. (citing Estate of Roberts, 388 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1980)).
17. 464 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1985).
18. 338 So. 2d I111 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). By its own terms, Lutgert
had previously applied only to antenuptial agreements contested in a dissolution of
marriage.
19. Specifically, the spouse must: (1) demonstrate that an antenuptial agreement
benefited one party in a grossly disproportionate manner, and (2) submit evidence that
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement were coercive. Id. at
1115-16.
20. 464 So. 2d at 1198.
21. 388 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. 1980).
22. 464 So. 2d at 1199 n.2.
1986]
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C. Standard of Proof in a Fraud Case: Wieczorck v. H & H
Builders, Inc.
The parties had already settled the case, but the supreme court
nonetheless retained jurisdiction over Wieczorck v. H & H Builders,
Inc.2" in order to clarify a murky24 but highly significant area of law:
the standard of proof applicable in a fraud action. Specifically, the
question presented was whether in an action seeking equitable relief,
fraud need be proven by only a preponderance of the evidence or by
clear and convincing evidence.
The court chose the former standard. Fraud, in Florida, need be
proven only by a preponderance or the "greater weight" of the evi-
dence, not necessarily by "clear and convincing" evidence.25 The
Wieczorck opinion is cryptic and scarcely addresses the rationale for
this decision. The court did, however, cite and rely on the 1981 case of
Rigot v. Bucci,26 in which it had adverted briefly to the historical devel-
opment of differing standards for actions at law and actions in equity.
The Rigot court found that, since the "law and equity sides of the
court" had been merged in modern times, there was no longer "sound
reason" for a distinction concerning the proof requisite to establish
fraud.27
As Justice Overton noted in his dissent in Wieczorck, the holding
represents a "substantial modification of a well-established rule of
law."2 Justice Overton also stressed the potential practical disadvan-
tages of the newly-clarified rule. The traditional requirement of "clear
and convincing evidence" in equity was based upon "the need for
strength and reliability of written agreements in the market place."
The older rule had also recognized that equitable remedies with respect
to written documents - cancellation, reformation, rescission - are
23. 475 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1985).
24. The court had created uncertainty by its own conflicting pronouncements in
the past. Id. at 228. In 1971, in Rigot v. Bucci, 245 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1971), the court
held that "only a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence is required to estab-
lish fraud, whether the action is at law or in equity." Id. at 53. Much more recently,
however, the court had stated that "proof of fraud must be by clear and convincing
evidence." Canal Authority v. Ocala Mfg., Ice and Packing Co., 332 So. 2d 321, 327
(Fla. 1976).
25. 475 So. 2d at 228.
26. 245 So. 2d at 51.
27. Id. at 52-53.
28. 475 So. 2d at 228 (Overton, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 10
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generally regarded as "much harsher" than the award of mere
damages.2 9
The dissenting justice predicted unfortunate consequences would
flow from the new standard, urging that "the strength, reliability, and
viability of written documents" in property and commercial transac-
tions would be substantially weakened. 30
II. Commercial Contracts: Parties' Choice of Law, Private
Limitations Period and Public Policy
The case of Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami, Inc.31 is of
interest for at least two reasons. First, it has important implications for
the Florida lawyer drafting a commercial contract for an interstate
transaction. The second reason is related: Burroughs presented the su-
preme court with the year's only major Uniform Commercial Code
issue.
Specifically, Burroughs set up a conflict between two provisions of
Florida law. A provision of the Florida UCC permits contracting par-
ties to agree that the law of another state will apply to their transac-
tion; another Florida statute specifically prohibits the parties from con-
tractually diminishing the Florida period of limitation of actions. What
happens when the parties choose the law of another state and then
agree, in accordance with the laws of that state, to a diminished limita-
tions period?
The Burroughs Corporation, a Michigan entity, had sold computer
equipment to a Florida clothing manufacturer, Suntogs of Miami. The
written sales contract stipulated, inter alia, that the law of Michigan
would govern the effect and interpretation of the contract. It also con-
tained a two-year limitation of action provision, as is specifically sanc-
tioned by Michigan law.32
Suntogs subsequently found that the computers did not function as
expected, and eventually ceased using them. It did not, however, bring
its suit against Burroughs within two years of the accrual of its cause
of action, as required by the contract. Thus, its contractual cause of
action would be dismissed if the Florida courts upheld the validity of
the choice of Michigan law and, in particular the two-year limitations
29. Id. at 229.
30. Id.
31. 472 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1985).
32. Id. at 1167 (citing MICH. Comp. LAWS, § 440.2725 (1970)).
1986]
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period grounded in Michigan legislation.
Each party was able to marshall Florida law to its support. On the
one hand, Burroughs invoked Florida commercial legislation which ex-
plicitly permits parties to choose the law of another state so long as
that state bears a "reasonable relation" to the transaction. 33 The provi-
sion was facially applicable here, as Michigan was clearly "reasonably
related" to the contract. And, its law unquestionably permitted parties
to choose a two-year limitations period.
Suntogs, on the other hand, relied on two Florida statutes in sup-
port of its position that the court should deny enforcement of the con-
tractual limitations clause. One provision renders void any contractual
limitations period shorter than that provided by the applicable Florida
statute of limitations;3 4 the applicable statute, in turn, provides for a
five-year limitations period.35
Faced with these conflicting results, the district court plausibly
held that (a) the choice of Michigan law in general was permissible,
but that (b) the Florida statute of limitations embodied a "strong pub-
lic policy" and therefore took precedence in Florida over the more flexi-
ble Michigan provisions.3"
The supreme court reversed and ruled the shorter period enforcea-
ble. In order to reach this result, the court first turned to a rather elab-
orate test for identifying "strong public policies."13 7 Applying it to the
33. FLA. STAT. § 671.105(1) (1975) is part of the Florida version of the Uniform
Commercial Code. That section provides: "[W]hen a transaction bears a reasonable
relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the
law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and
duties." (Emphasis added).
This "party authority" principle has been approved by the Florida Supreme Court
in Morgan Walton Properties, Inc. v. Int'l City Bank & Trust Co., 404 So. 2d 1059
(Fla. 1981), and Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507
(Fla. 1981).
34. FLA. STAT. § 95.03 (1975) renders void any contractual limitations period
shorter than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations.
35. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(2)(b) (1975), provides a five-year limitations period for
actions based on written contracts.
36. See Suntogs of Miami, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 433 So. 2d 581, 584 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 472 So. 2d at 1166 (holding that § 95.03 expresses a
"strong public policy" of the State of Florida, so as to prevail over the "party
autonomy").
37. Burroughs, 472 So. 2d at 1168. The court had previously elaborated and
applied this test in Continental Mortgage, 395 So. 2d at 509-10.
The Burroughs court found that the legislation on limitations periods failed every
part of the test for a "strong public policy." Primary among the criteria used for identi-
[Vol. 10
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statutes at issue, the court held that the limitations provisions of Flor-
ida law do not embody a "strong policy."38
The court did not, however, end its analysis there. It added that
the Florida limitations provisions "must be read in pari materia with
other [Florida] laws," in particular commercial legislation.3 9 In permit-
ting parties to choose the laws of another state to govern their rights
and duties, the legislature "recognized the need for parties to interstate
commercial transactions to know in advance which state's laws were to
apply.... This advance knowledge serves to reduce confusion and en-
courage quicker, easier resolutions."40 The court held, then, that the
contractual provision shortening the period for bringing a suit was fully
enforceable in Florida.
By virtue of its adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, Flor-
ida law had previously granted to parties to a contract for the sale of
goods41 the right to have their contract interpreted according to the law
of a state bearing a "reasonable relationship" to the transaction.
Through Burroughs, the court has made clear that parties may adopt
the limitations provisions of such a state as well.
III. Insurance Contracts
A. Unconstitutional Impairment of Contracts: State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Gant
The*Supreme Court invoked the prohibition against the impair-
ment of contracts contained in the Florida Constitution in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Gant.2 In consequence, it upheld
the strict terms of an automobile insurance policy and refused to apply
a Florida statute purportedly changing the terms of the policy.
The parties in Gant were a well-known insurance company and the
holders of two insurance policies. Defendant State Farm insured the
Gants' automobiles under two separate policies. By their express terms,
fying such a policy are: (1) a relative lack of exceptions to the law or rule in question;
(2) few or no amendments to the rule or statute, reflecting a fairly rigid policy; (3) a
characterization of the rule or law as "fundamental to the legal system"; and (4) the
"effect" of the rule or law on the contract - that is, whether limited or broad.
38. Burroughs, 472 So. 2d at 1168-69.
39. Id. at 1168.
40. Id. at 1168-69.
41. FLA. STAT. § 671.105(1) (1975) quoted supra at note 33.
42. 478 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1985).
1986]
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the policies forbade "stacking" of uninsured motorist coverage - that
is, cumulating the coverage of both policies in recovering for a single
automobile accident.
The Gants sought to overcome the language of the two contracts
by relying on a Florida legislative enactment 3 which allows an insured
to cumulate ("stack") uninsured motorist coverage. State Farm pointed
out that the legislation had not come into effect until after the policies
were issued. Since stacking would greatly increase the company's liabil-
ity to the Gants, State Farm argued that the legislation impaired its
obligations of contract in violation of the Florida Constitution. 44
The potential effect of the legislation on State Farm's obligations
was substantial. If the policies were enforced according to their terms,
State Farm would owe the Gants nothing, having already paid the
maximum recovery allowable on one of the policies. 45 However, if the
post-policy legislation were applied, the coverage would stack and the
company would be liable for an additional $30,000 to $100,000.46
The supreme court held that the Florida Constitution prohibited
application of the newly-amended statute to the contracts in issue. Any
other result would "violate the constitutional restriction on the impair-
ment of contracts" by subjecting State Farm to a "loss exposure" en-
tirely unforeseeable at the time it had issued the two policies.47
The Gant case does not break new ground in Florida law, as the
impairment-of-obligations clause has been applied before under concep-
tually similar circumstances.48 Its immediate interest lies, of course, in
the application of the clause to this particular type of insurance policy.
More generally, perhaps, Gant has a fascination of its own as an exam-
ple of that relatively rare breed, a true impairment of the obligations of
a contract.
43. The legislation at issue consisted of an amendment, effective October 1,
1980, to FLA. STAT. § 627.4312. Prior to the effective date of this amendment, stacking
was prohibited.
44. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 10, provides: "Prohibited laws. - No bill of attainder,
ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
45. 478 So. 2d at 26.
46. A secondary issue of the proceeding below was whether the uninsured motor-
ist coverage of the second policy should be $100,000 per accident or the $30,000 listed.
The Gants alleged that they had not knowingly rejected the higher limit. Id.
47. 478 So. 2d at 27.
48. The court found that Gant was controlled by its earlier decision in Dewberry
v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 1978) (then-new anti-stacking statute
inapplicable to insurance policy which specifically provided for stacking).
[Vol. 10
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B. Breach of Notice Clauses: Bankers Insurance Co. v. Macias
The Macias case, like Gant, is certain to gladden the hearts of
Florida insurance counsel. In Bankers Insurance Co. v. Macias,"9 the
Florida Supreme Court held that a presumption of prejudice to an in-
surance company arises when an insured fails to give timely notice of
an accident to the company, in breach of the policy's express terms.
Ms. Macias personal injury policy required that she give her in-
surer notice of an auto accident within a stated period. She was injured
in an accident in 1980, but the insurer was not notified until Ms. Ma-
cias brought a declaratory judgment against it two years later.50
I The supreme court ruled that in Florida the insurer is presumed to
have been prejudiced when the insured has not complied with the no-
tice requirement of an insurance contract. Under this presumption, the
burden is placed on the insured to rebut the presumption - in other
words, to show that no prejudice to the insurer has occurred. Since
plaintiff Macias failed to present any evidence on the prejudice issue,
judgment had properly been entered against her.51
Apart from this primary holding, two additional features of the
opinion are noteworthy. First, the court acknowledged that its decision
was contrary to the "modern trend" under which breach of the notice
clause is disregarded except where the insurer can show that "substan-
tial prejudice" resulted. 52 Here the court particularly noted the purpose
of the notice provision - to enable the insured to conduct a "timely
and adequate investigation of all circumstances surrounding the acci-
dent." Plaintiff Macias, through her failure to give notice, had deprived
State Farm of the opportunity to conduct any investigation into her
claims.
The court also indulged in a bit of dicta based on the classic con-
tract distinction concerning "conditions precedent" to a contractual ob-
ligation and "conditions subsequent." Very different procedural conse-
quences flow depending on what type of condition has been breached.
According to the court, the party seeking to avoid a condition prece-
dent, such as a notice requirement, should have the burden of showing
49. 475 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1985).
50. Id. at 1218.
51. Id. ("If the insured breaches the notice provision, prejudice to the insurer
will be presumed, but may be rebutted by a showing that the insurer has not been
prejudiced by the lack of notice."). Id.
52. Id. (citing Annot., 32 A.LR. 4TH 151 (1984)).
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lack of prejudice if he or she has failed to fulfill the condition.53 This
rule was, of course, applied to Macias.
The rule is otherwise, the court added, for a condition subsequent
for example, the cooperation clause of an insurance policy. There,
the party seeking to avoid liability (an insurer, for example) will bear
the burden of affirmatively showing prejudice due to the other party's
failure to fulfill the condition subsequent.54
C. Intended verses Incidental Beneficiaries: Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. McCarson
The greatest significance of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
McCarson55 unquestionably sounds in tort, for here the Florida Su-
preme Court recognized for the first time the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. A supreme court dictum on the contracts
issue, however, may come as "a surprise and disappointment" 56 in fu-
ture contracts cases in the State.
Briefly, the court in McCarson said that in Florida dependents
covered by a group medical insurance policy are "incidental" and not
intended beneficiaries of the insurance contract. A dependent who is
wrongfully denied coverage under such a policy will, therefore, have no
independent cause of action against the insurer.
IV. Contractual Issues and Employees
The supreme court decided two cases involving contracts of em-
ployment. In the first, it dealt with the contract status of special em-
ployees supplied by a temporary agency, and the second with tempo-
rary injunctions upholding covenants not to compete.
A. Contract Status of Employee Supplied by Temporary
Agency: Booher v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc.
The case of Booher v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc.58 stands alone in this
53. Macias, 475 So. 2d at 1217-18.
54. Id. at 1218.
55. 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985).
56. Id. at 281 (Shaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 278-80 ("It is axiomatic in contract law that an incidental beneficiary
cannot enforce the contract."). Id.
58. 468 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 1985).
[Vol. 10
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article as the sole case in which the supreme court held ineffective the
express language of a contract. Faced with the question whether a tem-
porary employee was an "employee" for worker's compensation pur-
poses, the court held that the facts and circumstances surrounding the
employment take precedence over contractual language designed to de-
termine the issue.
The plaintiff, Mr. Booher, had sued Pepperidge Farm in tort for
injuries he sustained while working as a temporary employee on Pep-
peridge Farm's premises. The company's ordinary employees would, of
course, be barred from bringing such a suit due to the worker's com-
pensation statute.5" However, Mr. Booher had been provided to Pepper-
idge Farm as a temporary employee by Dixie Driving Service, an
agency in the business of providing employees on a temporary basis.
Mr. Booher insisted he was employed by Dixie and not by Pepper-
idge Farm. He relied in great part on the written agreement between
the agency and Pepperidge Farm, which provided that Mr. Booher
would remain the agency's employee "for all purposes." 60 If enforced,
the contractual language would permit the suit against Pepperidge
Farm to go forward.
The supreme court found that, regardless of the language used in
the contract, Mr. Booher had consented to an implied contract of hire
with Pepperidge Farm and thus became its employee for purposes of
the worker's compensation statute. Here, "[t]he actual employment re-
lationship" should control. Neither the written contract nor the subjec-
tive intent of the parties could overcome the facts.6"
Although it affirmed the lower court's decision, the supreme court
pointedly did not adopt that forum's suggestion that virtually any tem-
porary employee is barred from suing his special employer for on-the-
job injuries.6 2 Rather, the supreme court appears to have retained the
test previously established in the cases for determining the question.
Under that test, the primary issue is whether the temporary employee
has consented, expressly or impliedly, to a contract of hire with the
non-agency employer.6 3 Booher does not amend the earlier case law,
59. Florida's Worker's Compensation statute limits an employer's liability to
payment of worker's compensation benefits. FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1985).
60. See Pepperidge Farm v. Booher, 446 So. 2d 1132, 1132-33 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984), rev'd, 468 So. 2d at 985.
61. 468 So. 2d at 985.
62. See Booher, 446 So. 2d at 1133.
63. See, e.g., Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 246 So. 2d 98, 101 (Fla.
1971); Stuyvesant Corp. v. Waterhouse, 74 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1954). See also Rainbow
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but establishes instead that the facts of the case will prevail over any
attempt by the employers to control the outcome through their written
agreement.
B. Temporary Relief for Violation of Covenant Not to Com-
pete: Capraro v. Lanier Business Products, Inc.
In Capraro v. Lanier Business Products, Inc. 4 the court approved
a presumption of "irreparable injury" to an employer seeking tempo-
rary relief against a former employee who violates a covenant not to
compete. Thomas Capraro, the defendant, had been employed by plain-
tiff Lanier Business Products. His written contract with Lanier con-
tained a covenant that Capraro would not engage in "competition"
with Lanier for one year after leaving their service. Subsequent to leav-
ing Lanier, Capraro violated the terms of the covenant and Lanier
sought a temporary injunction.
Underlying the lawsuit'was a Florida statute sanctioning covenants
not to compete and permitting enforcement by injunction. 65 In prelimi-
nary proceedings, Lanier adequately alleged a valid covenant and
breach by Capraro. The remaining pre-trial issue was whether "irrepa-
rable injury" could be presumed or whether Lanier had to shoulder the
burden of proving such injury in order to have Capraro enjoined from
pursuing his new employment.
The supreme court affirmed the lower court's holding that irrepa-
rable injury to Lanier would be presumed. To force the employer to
wait until irreparable injury had occurred, said the court, would often
"defeat the purpose" of both the covenant and the action."6 Where suit
is brought on an anti-competition covenant, "[i] mmediate injunctive re-
lief is [of] the essence. '67
Justice Overton's dissent is valuable in that it points out the degree
to which Florida law will protect an anti-competition agreement, in
derogation of the common law rule. 8 Defendant Capraro, for example,
had sold only one kind of product for Lanier and his sales territory had
Poultry Co. v. Ritter Rental System, Inc., 140 So. 2d 101, 103 (Fla. 1962) (main
factors in determining existence of employment relationship for worker's compensation
purposes).
64. 466 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985).
65. FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1981).
66. 466 So. 2d at 213.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 213-14 (Overton, J., dissenting).
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been confined to just one Florida county. The covenant in issue not only
prohibited Capraro from selling an entire array of products, but also
designated a five-county area as prohibited territory. Nonetheless, the
temporary injunction was issued.
Given the equities of this particular case, Justice Overton thought
that "At the very least, the employer should be required to prove that
irreparable harm will result to his business if a former employee is al-
lowed to work in a new territory not serviced by him in his prior em-
ployment." The justice also entered a plea that the legislature "modify
or repeal" the state's law so that judges would be free to apply proper
equitable principles to anti-competition agreements such as this one. 9
V. Miscellaneous
Several other cases decided by the court during the Survey period
are worthy of mention both for their individual holdings and as illustra-
tions of the court's strong tendency to enforce contracts as written.
A. Due-on-Sale Clause in a Mortgage: Weiman v. McHaffie
In Weiman v. McHaffie70 the Florida Supreme Court held that a
due-on-sale clause in a mortgage is enforceable in Florida. In order to
reach this result, the court was required to disapprove the earlier Lock-
wood rule that a due-on-sale clause was enforceable only if the mort-
gage lender could show impairment of security resulting from the sale
to another party.71 The Lockwood rule requiring impairment of secur-
ity prior to enforcement was based on a balancing of equities and pub-
lic policy.
The supreme court appeared to agree with none of the reasoning
69. Id. at 214. Justice Overton had made the same plea, namely, that the legisla-
ture modify or repeal § 542.33, in an earlier case. See Keller v. Twenty-Four Collec-
tion, Inc., 419 So. 2d 1048, 1050-51 (Fla. 1982) (Overton, J., dissenting).
70. 470 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1985). Note that the court in Weiman also answered a
question certified to it by the First District Court of Appeal involving the applicability
in Florida of the provision concerning due-on-sale clauses of the federal Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.
(1982). Not only is that portion of the opinion beyond the scope of this article, but the
court's holding in Weiman that such clauses are enforceable in Florida renders its dis-
cussion of Garn-St. Germain essentially academic.
71. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. of Englewood v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d
156, 160 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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behind Lockwood. Rather, it thought that the application of the im-
pairment rule might enable an individual mortgagor to avoid a reasona-
ble contract provision, and thus work an injustice to a given mortgage
lender.7 2 Apart from creating unfairness at the individual level, the
court predicted that judicial refusal to enforce due-on-sale clauses
could also result in a shortage of mortgage money in Florida, with neg-
ative consequences for both buyers and sellers in the state and for the
economy of Florida as a whole.73
At least one other case on the court's 1985 calendar was disposed
of by reference to Weiman, 7 4 and presumably other cases and contro-
versies now current in the state will also be settled by application of
that decision.
B. Gifts of Real Property to Non-Relatives: Chase Federal
Savings and Loan Association v. Schreiber
According to the dissenting opinion of Justice Overton, the su-
preme court in Chase Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Schrei-
ber75 created a "gigolo-mistress relief rule. '76 A judicial opinion calling
forth such a ringing condemnation is surely worthy of brief
examination.
The Schreiber plaintiff had, as a woman ninety years of age, trans-
ferred title to her home to a much younger man. The deed recited that
"[t]his quitclaim deed is being given with the consideration being love
and affection." The younger man in turn had sold the property to third
parties for $50,000, after which the elderly grantor sought cancellation
of both her deed of gift and the deed of sale to the third parties.7
The issue presented was whether "a deed given to a non-relative in
return only for 'love and affection' is without consideration" and there-
fore invalid, as was held by the court below.7 * The supreme court's
72. Weiman, 470 So. 2d at 684.
73. Id.
74. Pioneer Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985) (in Weiman
"we held that due-on-sale clauses are enforceable in Florida").
75. 479 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1985).
76. Id. at 104 (Overton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Id. at 94.
78. Id. at 95-96. In its discussion the supreme court cited and quoted from both
Florida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Havris, 366 So. 2d 491, 496 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), and Schreiber v. Chase Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 422 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3rd
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (en banc). The latter opinion had in turn adopted an earlier dis-
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examination of the issue took it back to the recondite origins of the so-
called "English rule" on which the lower court had relied and to the
Statute of Uses of 1535 from which it is derived. 9 Although clearly
fascinated with the arcana of both the rule and the Statute, the court
could find no basis in Florida equitable principles or in the state's legis-
lation for making consideration an absolute prerequisite to a binding
deed.
On these and other grounds, the court concluded that lack of con-
sideration does not by itself make voidable a gift of real property to a
non-relative.8 0 Rather, lack of consideration in such circumstances
should be merely a factor "to be considered along with others in decid-
ing whether fraud, undue influence, violation of confidence or uncon-
scionable advantage exists.""1
The court cautioned that its opinion should not be construed too
broadly, and did not "in any way affect the existing law of Florida"
requiring consideration to support contractual undertakings.8 2 Rather,
the court held only that "a deed, sufficient in form, voluntarily exe-
cuted by a competent grantor, is effective to convey the owner's legal
title regardless of whether he receives a contractual consideration."8 3
Despite the court's care in thus circumscribing its holding, Justice
Overton issued a dissent which surely ranks among history's most
sharply worded: "In my view the majority's decision provides a means
to protect title for gigolos, mistresses, and con artists, and alters four
and one-half centuries of common law in the process. '8 4 He saw -
perhaps correctly - the decision as likely to have extremely negative
effects on "the aged, infirm, and semiliterate members of our society"
for whom protective principles of law would no longer be in force.8 5
senting opinion of Judge Schwartz. Ross v. Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 424 So. 2d
779 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981). In both Schreiber and Havris, the Third DCA had
avoided a deed because no consideration had been given by the non-relative grantee.
79. Schreiber, 479 So. 2d at 97-99.
80. Id. at 100.
81. Id. at 99 (quoting I R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §
11.01 (1984)).
82. Id. at 101.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 102 (Overton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Id. at 104.
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C. Option Contracts: Robbinson v. Central Properties, Inc.
Another case reviewed by the court presented a quite tantalizing
issue under the rather dull garb of a contractual right of first refusal.
The plaintiffs in Robbinson v. Central Properties, Inc.86 alleged that
strict interpretation of their right of first refusal would effectively evis-
cerate the right. They argued that the contractual language should be
construed expansively so as to protect their opinion. The supreme court
rejected the argument, stating rather pointedly that parties will be held
to the "unambiguous" language of their contracts.
Under the contract at issue, plaintiff Central Properties had a
"right of first refusal" with respect to the defendant-optionor's water
and sewer system. The optionor's stockholders proposed to transfer the
system to another party but not through the direct means of an out-
right sale. Rather, they were exploring transfer through an indirect
means, namely sale of their capital stock. Since the company's primary
asset was the water and sewer system, a sale of the stock was tanta-
mount to a sale of the system itself.87
As holder of the option, Central Properties brought a suit pre-
mised on the notion that, under the circumstances, its right of first re-
fusal should extend to the stock transfer. The lower court accepted this
reading of the contract, since otherwise the purpose of the right of first
refusal "could be circumvented quite easily."88
The supreme court, however, agreed with the optionor that the
contract right could not be extended beyond its literal terms.89 Here,
the contractual language was unambiguous: the right of first refusal
referred to the water and sewer system, and made no reference at all to
the corporate stock. The contract contained no language upon which an
expansive reading could be based, nor any wording that rendered the
optionee's right ambiguous. Therefore, the right of first refusal was re-
stricted to the water and sewer system; Central Properties was helpless
to prevent the transfer of the system by sale of the stock.
As to Central Properties' argument that this holding allowed the
optionor's shareholders to "frustrate and circumvent" the purpose of
the option contract, the court found "no merit" in the contention: "the
parties were free at the time of entering into the contract to extend the
86. 468 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1985).
87. Id. at 988.
88. Id. at 987.
89. Id.
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right of first purchase to stock sales and transfers ... "90
The case sounds a clear warning to draftsmen of Florida contracts
to anticipate at the outset the various means through which a contrac-
tual purpose may be undercut. The warning may, however, be one
which the human drafter of a contract is simply unable fully to heed: to
foresee and make provision for the twists and turns that fate will pre-
sent during the lifetime of the document.
D. Settlement Agreements: Robbie v. City of Miami
It seems fitting that a review of Florida contracts cases should end
- as do the great majority of lawsuits - with a settlement agreement.
The supreme court reviewed a disputed settlement agreement in Robbie
v. City of Miami.91
The court upheld the agreement and, in doing so, reiterated sev-
eral well-established black-letter principles. For example, settlements
are "highly favored" and will be enforced "whenever possible." Their
existence as enforceable agreements is, moreover, to be determined by
an "objective test" which looks to "external signs" rather than to a
subjective meeting of the minds.92
More pertinently to the case under review, the court held that a
settlement becomes enforceable when objective evidence shows that the
parties have said the same thing as to the "essential elements" of the
agreement, regardless of whether agreement has been reached on all
"contingencies." The court cited with approval an earlier case where it
had written: "Even though all the details are not definitely fixed, an
agreement may be binding if the parties agree on the essential terms
and seriously understand and intend the agreement to be binding on
them."9 3
If ever a term represented a contingency, it was the disputed pro-
vision in the Robbie agreement. The Miami Dolphins and the City of
Miami had agreed to settle a contract dispute concerning the Dolphins'
use of the City's stadium. At the last minute, the Dolphins objected to
a single term of the agreement: the amount the team would owe if an
90. Id. at 988.
91. 469 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1985).
92. Id. at 1385 (citing Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976), and Blackhawk Heating and Plumbing
Co. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 302 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1974)).
93. Blackhawk Heating, 302 So. 2d at 408.
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"Act of God" prevented it from playing the last game of the season.
The court's approach to the problem was extremely practical - the
settlement would be enforced; if an Act of God prevents the last game
from being played, "the parties can litigate" the Dolphins' liability.9
The Robbie opinion does not expand, but certainly affirms the
principle that Florida courts will enforce settlements even when some
terms are still open, so long as the "essential elements" have been
agreed upon.
VI. Conclusion
The contracts cases of the Survey period are not necessarily typi-
cal of the supreme court's rulings in any given year. Taken by them-
selves, however, the 1985 cases do reveal a single overwhelming trend:
enforcement of consensual agreements according to their terms, against
all manner of inducements to the contrary. The Florida Supreme Court
showed itself careful to protect the expectations of the parties, highly
respectful of the legislature, yet individualistic in its own approach.
Undoubtedly the single greatest change in Florida contract law for
1985 comes out of Johnson v. Davis,95 the landmark case in which the
court overruled centuries of common law to create a duty of disclosure
in sale-of-home transactions.
94. Robbie, 469 So. 2d at 1386.
95. 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985). See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
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